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The Prosecutor's Duty To Present Exculpatory Evidence to an 
Indicting Grand Jury 
A decision of the Supreme Court of California in 1975 raised 
important questions about the responsibilities of a prosecutor in pre-
senting evidence to a grand jury. In Johnson v. Superior Court,1 
the court held that the prosecutor has a duty, implied by statute, to 
inform the grand jury of any evidence reasonably tending to negate 
guilt. The issues presented by this case touch upon a much larger 
debate about the nature of the entire indictment process. 
This Note explores the implications of the stark procedural dis-
parities between prosecution by information and prosecution by 
indictment in those states where both methods are used. It first 
examines the consequences to a defendant of a prosecutor's decision 
to seek an indictment rather than proceed by information, the 
reasons underlying the discretion given the prosecutor to choose be-
tween the two methods, and the potential for abuse of this discretion-
ary power. It then considers several alternative approaches for mini• 
mizing this potential for abuse. After rejecting possible constitu-
tional objections to the disparity between indictment and information 
procedures and application of the common-law doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel, this Note contends that a more satis-
factory solution would be to eliminate the prosecutor's incentive to 
opt for indictment when no public policy justifies that choice. In 
this regard, this Note gives particular attention to the effects of the 
rule articulated in Johnson. 
I. THE INITIATION OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
A. Indictment Versus Information 
It is an historical curiosity of the Anglo-American legal tradition 
that there are two distinct procedures for initiating a criminal prose-
cution-indictment and information. 2 Slightly more than half of the 
1. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975). 
2. For a summary account of the historical evolution of these two procedures, sec 
Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information-
An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 HASTINGS LJ. 997, 998-1000 (1974); 
Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pt. 1), 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 102-23 
(1931). 
There has been much criticism of the utility and procedural fairness of the grand 
jury, which is the central mechanism of the indictment process. See, e.g., Watts, 
Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?, 31 N.C.L. REv. 290 
(1959); Coates, Grand Jury, the Prosecutors Puppet. Wasteful Nonsense of Crim-
inal Jurisprudence, 33 PA. B.A.Q. 311 (1962); text at notes 14-27 infra. The 
grand jury was abolished in Great Britain in 1933, and several state constitutions al-
1514 
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states require that prosecution/of all felonies be by indictment. 3 The 
remainder-the so-called ;itiformation" states-allow the prosecutor 
to choose either method;ci though in most of these states there is a 
predominant reliance o_n information. 5 
From the defendant's perspective, the most significant difference 
between indictment and information is the extent to which he is able 
to participate in ,the process. In a prosecution by information, the 
filing of an official accusation against the defendant is preceded by 
a preliminary hearing before a magistrate. 6 It is the prosecutor's re-
sponsibility to produce enough evidence at this hearing to justify a 
finding of "probable cause."7 The defendant, in turn, may testify 
low for its legislative abolition, see, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7, NEB. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 10, but its existence has not been seriously threatened since the 1930s. 
3. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 865 
(4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KAMisAR]. 
Although the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a 
right to indictment in all felony cases prosecuted in federal courts, it has been held 
that the fourteenth amendment does not similarly restrict state prosecutions. See 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); note 41 infra. Thus, states are free 
to prosecute felonies by procedures other than indictment. 
4. Characterizing state prosecutorial procedures as either "indictment" or "in-
formation" necessarily ignores many of the specific differences among the fifty juris-
dictions. For discussion of the requirements of the individual states, see L. KA'IZ, 
L. LITWIN & R. BAMBERGER, JU5flCE Is THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY 
CASES 247-365 (1972); Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, AM. 
CRIM. L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964). 
5. For example, in California, which uses the indicting grand jury far more fre-
quently than most states, less than five per cent of all felony' cases are prosecuted by 
indictment. Nevertheless, in terms of the number of cases so prosecuted, this figure 
is significant. KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 868. 
6. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 738 (West 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 
592 (1976); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14. After deciding that a case should be prose-
cuted, the prosecutor will first prepare a complaint that specifies the charge against 
the defendant. At this initial juncture, the prosecutor decides whether to proceed by 
information or indictment. The filing of the information after a preliminary hearing 
constitutes the formal accusation against the defendant, as does the grand jury's in-
dictment. In some jurisdictions, however, the usual statutory requirement of a com-
plaint and preliminary hearing does not apply to an information that has been filed 
directly with the court at the outset of the prosecution. KAMisAR, supra note 3, at 
977. 
1. See generally Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable Cause in 
Grand Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examinations, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 102, 
115-19 (1963). Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 432 P.2d 197, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 581 (1967), illustrates the competing notions of what "probable cause" entails 
in the setting of a preliminary hearing. In Rideout, the majority of the California 
Supreme Court stated that for purposes of a preliminary hearing "[p]robable cause 
is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and con-
scientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused." 67 Cal. 2d at 
474, 432 P.2d at 199, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The dissenters, on the other hand, argued 
that the test for probable cause in these circumstances is whether some evidence 
exists in regard to each element of the crime that, if unexplained by the defendant, 
would warrant a conviction by a trial jury. 67 Cal. 2d at 476, 432 P.2d at 200, 62 
Cal. Rptr. at 581 (Peters, J., dissenting). 
It has been suggested that the majority of the Rideout court applied what may 
be called the "arrest warrant" standard for probable cause, while the dissenters ad-
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on his own behalf, cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and call wit-
nesses of his own. 8 At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate 
considers the evidence before him and issues one of three possible 
orders: that the defendant be bound over for trial on the stated 
charge, that the charge be modified or reduced, or that the defendant 
be released for lack of probable cause to charge him. 0 If the hear-
ing results in a finding of probable cause, an information officially 
accusing the defendant is prepared and filed with the trial court.10 
The indictment procedure differs in several significant respects. 
The prosecutor must convince a statutorily prescribed majority of 
grand jurors rather than a single magistrate that probable cause 
exists.11 Also, the defendant has no constitutional or statutory right 
to appear before the grand jury and hence has no opportunity to re-
but the prosecution's case.12 In those instances where indictment 
precedes arrest, the prospective defendant will not even know that 
an indictment is being considered. When a majority of the jurors 
is convinced that probable cause has been established, the charges 
that the/prosecutor has prepared are issued as the grand jury's official 
accusation.13 
While the most important differences between the two proce-
dures are apparent even in this summary description, the specific 
consequences of these disparities deserve fuller exposition. Certainly 
the most significant consequence--for both the defendant and the 
state-is that the indictment process may not be as effective a 
"screening device" as the information and preliminary hearing. Al-
though several arguments can be made for the relative ineffectiveness 
of indictment in disposing of cases where the state is not likely to 
prevail at trial, any inferiority would appear to follow in large 
measure from the fact that the indicted defendant is denied the op-
hered to a "directed acquittal" or "prima facie case" standard. See KAMISAR, supra 
note 3, at 987-88. While some jurisdictions follow one of these approaches, many 
courts state only that the reviewing magistrate need not be convinced of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 988. 
Some commentators have argued that application of the "arrest warrant" standard 
largely vitiates the screening function of the preliminary hearing. Id. at 989-90, 
citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-.Aruw:GNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 and p. 91 (Tent. Draft 
No. 5, 1972); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SusPEcr wrrn 
A CRIME 86-89 (1970). 
8. KAMisAR, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. The required size of the grand jury ranges from six to twenty-three members 
in the various jurisdictions, fifteen or sixteen being the norm. The majority required 
for indictment consequently varies with the size of the panel. For requirements of 
the individual states, see Spain, supra note 4, at 126-42. 
12. See KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 10. 
13. See id. 
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portunity to appear and give evidence.14 In the preliminary exami-
nation, the defendant and his counsel will be able to cross-examine 
witnesses, present favorable testimony, and generally challenge the 
prosecutor's assertion of probable cause.15 If the defendant presents 
adequate exculpatory evidence, he will be spared both the expense 
and the ignominy of public trial, 16 and the state will be spared an 
inefficient use of judicial resources. In short, the indictment process 
lacks ~e adversarial qualities of a preliminary examination and for 
this reason alone may be less effective as a screening mechanism. 
Moreover, the nonadversarial nature of the indictment process 
has several additional implications for the effectiveness of that proce-
dure as a screening mechanism. First, in a preliminary examination, 
where the possibility exists that the defendant will rebut the prosecu-
tor's presentation, the prosecutor will be forced to prepare his case 
more thoroughly and at an earlier date in order to uncover any 
hidden weaknesses.17 By contrast, the relative ease with which an 
indictment can be obtained in an ex parte grand jury proceeding vir-
tually insures that an indictment case will not be as thoroughly pre-
pared until shortly before trial. This may lead to unnecessary expo-
sure of the defendant to trial where there is little chance of convic-
tion and as a consequence may waste judicial resources. 
Second, the nonadversarial nature of the grand jury has caused 
many observers to doubt the ability of the jurors to make an inde-
pendent determination of probable cause equivalent to that which 
14. See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles: Some 
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 636, 661-85 
(1971). Other factors that Graham and Letwin find significant are the centralization 
of grand jury decisionmaking and the lack of legal training among grand jurors. 
15. While the due process clause requires the states to provide a probable cause 
hearing to justify "extended restraint on liberty" following the arrest of the accused, 
the Constitution does not mandate that this determination of probable cause be ac-
companied by "the full panoply of adversary safeguards--counsel, confrontation, 
cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 114, 119-23 (1975). However, indigent defendants have the right to ap-
pointed counsel when appearing in a fully adversarial preliminary hearing, a proceed-
ing utilized by many states even though it is not constitutionally required under Ger-
stein, because such a hearing is a "critical stage" in the prosecution. Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). In his concurring opinion in Coleman, Justice 
White noted that providing lawyers at this "critical stage" might further induce pros-
ecutors to take a case directly to the grand jury, thereby "inviting elimination of 
the preliminary hearing system" entirely. 399 U.S. 1, 17-18 (White, J., concurring). 
Relying on Coleman, critics of the grand jury procedure have argued that, if the 
accused is in need of a lawyer to argue the issue of probable cause before a judicial 
officer, then the presence of counsel is hardly less crucial when a body of laymen 
is called upon to apply the same legal standard. See Dash, The Indicting Grand 
Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 .AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807, 815 (1972). 
16. The possibility exists, however, that the prosecutor may choose to refile the 
charges before a second magistrate or seek an indictment. See text at notes 65-85 
infra. 
17. See Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. 
L.F. 423, 441 (1966). 
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a magistrate would make in a preliminary hearing.18 The prosecutor 
selects the witnesses, the evidence to be presented, and the charge 
to be considered. He may also explain questions of law to the jury 
and instruct them on the amount of evidence necessary to justify an 
indictment.19 To the extent that the prosecutor can manipulate the 
grand jury verdict, the indictment procedure will not be as effective 
a screening device as the preliminary hearing. 20 
A third factor may affect the relative value of each procedure 
as a screening mechanism. Some jurisdictions apply different rules 
of evidence depending upon the type of proceeding used to deter-
mine the existence of probable cause. In California, for example, 
the admissibility of evidence at the preliminary examination is gov-
erned by the same rules that apply at trial.21 The proof that will 
authorize a California magistrate to hold the accused for trial must 
consist of legally competent evidence; no other type of evidence may 
be considered by the magistrate.22 A grand jury indictment, how-
18. As long ago as 1931, Dean Morse came to the conclusion, based on his own 
empirical investigation, that the grand jury rarely acted as an independent body in 
deciding whether to indict a particular defendant. Instead, he determined that it 
tended to stamp with approval, often uncritically, the wishes of the prosecuting at-
torney. Morse's 21-state survey revealed that grand juries returned indictments in 
approximately 83% of the cases initiated by district attorneys, and only in 5% of the 
cases did the district attorney disagree with the grand jury's disposition of the case. 
Morse, supra note 2 (pts. 1 & 3 ), at 141, 151, 329. Similarly, the editor of a re-
spected manual for prosecuting attorneys has stated frankly: "It is a very poor 
prosecutor who cannot bring a grand jury to adopt any position with respect to the 
proceeding that he wishes to take." Ploscowe & Spiero, The Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office and the Control of Organized Crime, in I ORGANIZED CRIME & LAW ENFORCE· 
MENT 217, 220 (M. Ploscowe ed. 1953), reprinted in MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING 
ArroRNEYS 315, 318 (M. Ploscowe ed. 1956). 
Defenders of the grand jury make two points in rebuttal: (1) that the high in-
cidence of agreement between the grand jury and the prosecutor indicates only that 
the state is careful in its selection of cases, and (2) that even the relatively small 
number of cases in which the grand jury disagrees with the prosecutor is sufficient 
to justify its continued existence. Note, An Examination of the Grand Jury in New 
York, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 88, 98-99 (1966); see Dession, From Indictment 
to Information-Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163, 179 (1932). 
19. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 I. CRIM. L. & C. 174, 177 (1973). 
As one trial judge has noted, it is ironic that the only person in the grand jury room 
who has a clear idea of what is happening is the very public official whom the novice 
jurors are supposed to keep in check. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted 
Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965). 
20. If the defendant believes that the grand jury had no grounds upon which to 
indict him, he may, in some jurisdictions, seek dismissal of the indictment or issuance 
of a writ of prohibition. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CooE §§ 995, 999a (West 1970); 
People v. Rojas, 2 Cal. App. 3d 767, 771, 82 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (1969). However, 
the availability of post-indictment relief under some circumstances does not negate 
all potential harm to the defendant and, as an independent procedure, it cannot lend 
support to the view that the grand jury itself is an effective screening device. 
21. See Ex Parte Plummer, 79 Cal. App. 2d 651, 655, 180 P.2d 771, 775 (1947); 
Note, supra note 7, at 116. 
22. People v. Schuber, 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 775-76, 163 P.2d 498, 499-500 
(1945). 
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ever, will not be quashed on constitutional grounds merely because 
it was based on the prosecution's use of hearsay or other incompetent 
evidence. 23 In addition many courts will sustain an indictment even 
though illegal and incompetent evidence was submitted and consid-
ered so long as some legal evidence was also submitted. 24 
In addition to the indictment's often-inferior performance as a 
screening device, a second consequence of that procedure is the de-
nial of several incidental advantages that are normally available to 
a defendant in the preliminary hearing. The most important of 
these is the opportunity to discover elements of the prosecution's 
case. 25 Although courts have repeatedly held that using the pre-
liminary examination as a tool for pretrial discovery is not a 
legitimate interest of the defendant, 26 the disparity of opportunity for 
discovery afforded the accused by the indictment and the preliminary 
hearing is still relevant to any policy debate about the desirability 
of treating similarly situated defendants in very different ways. 27 
Thus, it should be apparent that these alternative- methods of 
prosecution affect defendants in significantly different ways. Al-
though some commentators question the degree of disparity,28 it is 
beyond dispute that differences do exist and that the indicted de-
fendant can be disadvantaged. 
B. Rational,es for Prosecutorial Discretion 
In California, as in most information states, the prosecutor is ex-
tremely selective in deciding what cases will be routed to the grand 
jury for indictment. 29 In this regard he has virtually unlimited dis-
23. The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments requires only that the grand jury be legally constituted and un-
biased. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
24. See Note, supra note 7, at 115. 
25. The preliminary hearing also may be used to perpetuate witnesses' testimony 
for possible impeachment at trial, to have bail reduced, to plea bargain, or to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of some of the prosecution's evidence. See KAMISAR, supra 
note 3, at 960-67. 
26. See, e.g., Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Burke v. Superior Court, 3 Ariz. App. 576, 416 P.2d 
997 (1966); State v. Grant, 9 N.C. App. 704, 705-06, 177 S.E.2d 314, 314-15 (1970). 
But see United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 
1967). 
27. Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The De-
veloping Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REV. 437, 467-68 (1972). 
28. Particularly contested is the charge that the grand jury serves as little more 
than a rubber stamp for the prosecutor. However, the debate centers on the signifi-
cance to be attributed to the grand jury's tendency to concur with the prosecutor's 
position rather than on whether such a tendency exists. See generally Dession, supra 
note 18; White, In Defense of the Grand Jury, 25 PA. B.A.Q. 260 (1954); Lumbard, 
The Criminal Justice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 397 (1967); note 
18 supra. 
29. See note 5 supra. 
1520 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 7S:1S14 
cretion, since state constitutions and penal codes generally provide 
no standards to guide the prosecutor in choosing a particular proce-
dure. 30 Such discretion is heightened even further by the fact that 
a prosecutor's choice of process is not binding; a case may be initi-
ated by information without causing the prosecutor to forgo the 
option of seeking an indictment. 31 Thus, a suspect may be charged 
and arrested, have a date set for his preliminary hearing, and still 
be indicted by the grand jury. If the indictment is issued before 
the preliminary examination is held, the intervening action by the 
grand jury is considered to be an adequate determination of probable 
cause, and the preliminary examination is "mooted."32 Because the 
prosecutor's choice may have serious consequences for a defendant, 
it is important to consider whether this discretionary power is justi-
fied by any countervailing interests. 
There are several situations in which allowing the prosecutor to 
choose the method of initiating an action against the accused is either 
necessary or desirable as a matter of policy. 33 First, there are cases 
in which the accused has evaded apprehension and thereby rendered 
it impossible to proceed by information, which requires the presence 
of the accused, within the time fixed by the statute of limitations. 34 
Second, situations exist where the prosecutor may seek an indictment 
to avoid premature cross-examination of emotional or reluctant wit-
nesses such as children, victims of sex crimes, or confidential police 
30. See, e.g., CAL CoNsr. art. ·I § 8; CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 682, 737 (West 1970). 
See Report of the Grand Jury Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, 9 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 14S, 1S7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Report]. 
31. See Grand Jury Report, supra note 30, at 1S8; Federal Magistrate's Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1970). Nor is the prosecutor bound by the results of either 
method. He could lose in either forum and repeat the process before a second magis-
trate or a second grand jury, or he could lose at the preliminary hearing and then 
proceed by indictment. See Graham & Letwin, supra note 14, at 734-3S. 
32. See People v. Petruso, 3S Ill. 2d S78, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966); State v. Burk, 
82 N.M. 466, 467-68, 483 P.2d 940, 941-42 (1971); KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 91S. 
In Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
906 (1968), the court stated: "A post-indictment preliminary examination would 
be an empty ritual, as the government's burden of showing probable cause would be 
met merely by offering the indictment Even if the [magistrate] disagreed with the 
grand jury, he could not undermine the authority of its finding." 
However, at least two information states require a post-indictment preliminary 
hearing based on the premise that it performs significant screening functions absent 
in the grand jury process. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § S24 (West 1969); 
MrcH. GEN. Cr. R. 788; People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972), 
discussed in note 44 infra. If the hearing results in a finding of lack of probable 
cause, the indictment may be dismissed. Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Okla. Crim. 
1971). 
33. See Alexander & Portman, supra note 2, at 1008 n.66; Kinaga & Jordan, Some 
Limitations and Controls of the California Grand Jury ISystem, 2 SANTA CLARA LAW, 
78, 79 (1962); KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 869-70. 
34. See Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA, 
L. REV. 668, 681 (1962). 
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informants. 35 Third, there are instances in_ which the prosecutor needs 
the special investigative powers of the grand jury.36 Political 
cases-particularly those involving public officials and corruption 
charges-are likely to fall within this category. Finally, some cases 
involve multiple defendants;37 if indictment were not available in this 
situation, the prosecutor would face the potential burden of many 
preliminary hearings as a consequence of one mass arrest. 
Thus, there are a number of situations in which the significant 
disparity in treatment of defendants resulting from prosecution by 
indictment rather than information may be justified. The prosecu-
tor's discretionary power is at least defensible where it can be ar-
gued, as in these examples, that the administration of justice is 
improved by the availability ·of the option. Yet, there is no guaran-
tee whatsoever in most information states that the prosecutor will use 
his discretion to prosecute by indictment in only those situations 
where the circumstances warrant that procedure. He need not 
justify his choice of process in a particular case. 38 Because of the 
potentially prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's choice upon the in-
dividual defendant, it would appear desirable either to limit the use 
of that discretion or to minimize the impact of the differences 
between the procedures. 
C. Mechanisms for Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion 
At least three alternative mechanisms exist for .minimizing the 
disparate impact of indictment and information. First, a court could 
declare this disparity to be unconstitutional under state or federal 
constitutions. Second, a court could give res judicata or collateral 
estoppel effect to a dismissal by a magistrate following a preliminary 
hearing. Finally, a court could impose, under common law or by 
interpretation of a state statute, the rule of Johnson v. Superior Court39 
-that the prosecutor is obligated to disclose exculpatory information 
to a grand jury. The remainder of this Note explores the feasibility 
and desirability of these alternatives. 
1. Constitutional Attacks on Indictment 
In 1884, the Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California40 rejected 
35. See Note, The California Grand Jury-Two Current Problems, 52 CALIF. L 
REV. 116, 118 (1964). 
36. These powers include the use of subpoenas to compel testimony, the use of 
subpoenas duces tecum, and the granting of witness immunity. More generally, the 
prosecutor may simply desire the secrecy of the grand jury procedure to protect an 
ongoing investigation from public disclosure. See KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 869. 
37. Two obvious examples are conspiracy and large-scale drug cases. 
38. See text at note 30 supra. 
39. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975). See text at note 
1 supra. 
40. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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the argument that the substitution of information for indictment in 
state cases contravened the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, 41 and therefore it upheld California's use of the· infor-
mation in felony cases.42 Three decades later, the Court affirmed 
that it was not a denial of due process for a state to deprive a defen-
dant of a preliminary hearing so long as there was a showing of prob-
able cause through some other means. 43 In effect, these holdings 
recognized that indictment and information are constitutionally 
acceptable as alternative mechanisms for establishing probable 
cause. 
With very few exceptions, the position of the Supreme Court has 
been followed whenever the issue of the constitutionality of an in-
dictment procedure has been raised in state courts. 44 In these cases, 
the defendants have usually made two constitutional claims under the 
fourteenth amendment: that they were deprived of due process 
when indictment was substituted for the information procedure, and 
that they were denied equal protection by the prosecutor's exercise 
of his discretionary power. Both arguments have been singularly 
unsuccessful. 
Due process claims face two formidable obstacles: the preceden-
tial weight of past decisions affirming the constitutionality of indict-
ment, and the reluctance of the judiciary to tamper with the powers 
and privileges of the grand jury. Supreme Court decisions uphold-
ing the right of states to use either indictment or information45 are 
supported by a subsidiary line, of federal cases holding that the 
only constitutionally protected function of the preliminary hear-
41. The Court held that the fifth amendment provision for indictment by grand 
jury is not incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and therefore does not apply 
to the states. 110 U.S. at 538. 
42. In a lengthy and emotional dissent, Justice Harlan wrote: 
Thus, in California, nothing stands between the citizen and prosecution for 
his life, except the judgment of a justice of the peace. . . . Anglo-Saxon liberty 
would, perhaps, have perished long before the adoption of our Constitution, 
had it been in the power of government to put the subject on trial for his life 
whenever a justice of the peace, holding his office at the will of the crown, 
should certify that he had committed a capital crime. 
110 U.S. at 554. 
43. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). 
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McC!oskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764 (1971). 
However, at least one state supreme court has expressed serious doubts about the con-
stitutional "equivalence" of the two procedures. In People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 
201 N.W.2d 629 (1972), the Michigan court refrained from ruling on the constitu-
tional question but exercised its inherent power over matters of criminal court pro• 
cedure to order post-indictment preliminary examinations for all defendants. In so 
ordering, the court noted that in the preliminary hearing a defendant's rights are fully 
recognized and evidentiary rules are followed, while the laymen on the grand jury 
are often incapable of understanding the technical legal issues of a case or the rules 
of evidence and hence must rely solely on the prosecutor. 388 Mich. at 501-02, 201 
N.W.2d at -634. 
45. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 40 & 43 supra. 
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ing is its determination of probable cause.46 Neither discovery nor 
any of the other ancillary benefits of the preliminary hearing have 
been considered aspects of due process. 47 In addition, following 
Hurtado v. California,48 many information states like California have 
implanted in the text of their state constitutions the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that indictment and information are "equivalent" proce-
dures under the federal constitution. 49 
In his concurring opinion in Johnson, Justice Mosk challenged 
the position that indictment and information are constitutionally 
equivalent by observing that there are more due process safeguards 
for parole revocation than for grand jury indictment. 50 Under stand-
ards set by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,51 parole revo-
cation requires two separate prerevocation hearings-a preliminary 
hearing at the place of _arrest and a revocation hearing at the correc-
tional institution to which the parolee is returned. The first hearing 
is designed merely to determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe that the parolee has violated a condition of parole. The 
Court articulated substantial due process requirements for this initial 
hearing, even though only the conditional liberty of the parolee is 
at issue here. The parolee must be notified of the scheduled hear-
ing and of what parole violations have been alleged. In addition, 
he is entitled as a matter of right to appear, to speak in his own be-
half, to present witnesses and other evidence, and to question 
adverse witnesses who must be made available on the parolee's 
request. 52 · 
It seemed anomalous to Justice Mosk that an essentially ex parte 
proceeding before a grand jury is sufficient to put in jeopardy the 
46. See Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
906 (1968). 
41. See Nakell, supra note 27, at 467-68. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
(1970), the Supreme Court had created the possibility for some movement away from 
this position by emphasizing the practical importance of the preliminary hearing's dis-
covery function to the defendant. However, the Court did not deal specifically with 
this issue in the context of the circuit court decisions on the matter, see note 46 
supra, and there is some doubt about how much of the Coleman language remains 
after Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), where the Court stated that "[t]he sole 
issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending 
further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary 
hearing." 420 U.S. at 120. See note 15 supra. At best only a mild challenge has 
been entertained against the traditional assumption. that all of the constitutionally 
required protections of the preliminary hearing are provided by the grand jury proce-
dure. 
48. 110 U.S. 516 (1884), discussed in notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text. 
49. E.g., CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 8; CoNN. CONST. art. I, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. I, 
§ 17(j); WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 25. 
50. 15 Cal. 3d at 263, 539 P.2d. at 802, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 42. 
51. 408 U.S. 471, 484-89 (1972). 
52. See People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 456-57, 503 P.2d 1313, 1317, 105 Cal. 
Rptr. 305, 309 (1972). 
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liberty of a prospective indictee when the same proceeding is consid-
ered inadequate to terminate the conditional liberty of a parole 
violator. 53 This argument, however, fails to take into account the 
vastly different settings of the two procedures. While both kinds 
of hearings are designed to determine the issue of probable cause, 
they function in dissimilar circumstances. Unlike the grand jury pro-
ceeding, where in particular cases there is a legitimate need for 
secrecy, in parole revocation hearings there is no need for secrecy 
that justifies curtailing the defendant's rights of notice and partic-
ipation. Moreover, there is virtually nothing that the parolee can 
do to frustrate the judicial process. This is not the case at the 
indictment stage, where the prospective indictee can potentially 
escape prosecution by flight, by destruction of evidence, or by intimi-
dation of prosecution witnesses. In short, situations exist in which 
preserving the ability of the judicial system to carry out its essential 
functions may necessarily require a curtailment of the defendant's 
rights, 54 and the indictment proceeding is one such situation. While 
the decisionmaking apparatus in parole revocation may operate less 
"efficiently" when accommodating such rights, it will not be impeded 
from performing its essential function. Thus, due process chal-
lenges to the indictment proceeding that rely on Morrissey are not 
likely to be successful. 
Due process challenges to the alleged procedural shortcomings 
of indictment are resisted not only by the precedential weight of past 
decisions but also by the hoary traditions surrounding the grand 
jury. 55 Any attempt to transform the grand jury hearing into a true 
functional equivalent of the preliminary examination before a magis-
trate would necessitate an invasion of the traditional secrecy of that 
body. 56 Reformers who have sought to modify some aspect of grand 
jury procedure-by demanding, for example, that defendants be 
provided with transcripts of their grand jury testimony-have discov-
ered that courts are extremely reluctant to invade these preroga-
tives. 57 It seems realistic to expect that the solicitude that the courts 
53. 15 Cal. 3d at 263, 539 P.2d at 802-03, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43. 
54. See texl: at notes 33-37 supra. 
55. Those traditions antedate the information and preliminary hearing methods. 
See Grand Jury Report, supra note 30, at 157. As a special institution occupying 
a unique place in the judicial system, the grand jury has developed its own procedural 
rules. It may subpoena witnesses, hear any kind of evidence without restriction, and 
conduct its deliberations in secrecy. To the extent that there is supervision of its 
activities, that function is likely to be performed by the public prosecutor rather than 
by a judge. See Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial 
Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHr. L. REV. 761, 763-68 (1972). 
56. Even its critics admit that the mere right of a defendant to have counsel pre-
sent might prevent the grand jury from carrying out at least some of its traditional 
functions. See Nakell, supra note 27, at 468. 
51. See generally Dash, supra note 15. 
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have shown in the past for this institution58 will continue to frustrate 
those whose due process claims threaten its structural foundations. 
Equal protection arguments have fared no better in these cases. 59 
As one commentator has observed, it is extremely difficult in the 
field of criminal procedure to determine those bases of discrimina-
tion other than race or economic status that amount to invidious dis-
crimination. 00 Even in cases where the prosecutor's decision to pro-
ceed by indictment might have been motivated in part by the desire 
to deny the defendant certain procedural rights afforded by the infor-
mation procedure, courts have found no denial of equal protection. 61 
Furthermore, this conclusion seems consistent with the generally 
broad discretionary power accorded prosecutors in making proce-
dural decisions. 62 
To recapitulate, it appears that constitutional challenges to the 
disparity between indictment and information lack substantial force. 
This conclusion accurately reflects the experience in California; typi-
cal challenges based on denial of due process and of equal protection 
were rejected by the court of appeal in 1969. 63 Hence, until 
1971, California courts had done virtually nothing to limit the prose-
cutor's discretionary power to maneuver between indictment and in-
formation. As a result, the prosecutor retained a great deal of power 
to predetermine the defendant's initial status before the trial court.64 
58. -See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430-31 (1969); Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). 
59. See, e.g., People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 
(1972). 
60. Theis, Preliminary Hearings in Homicide Cases: A Hearing Delayed Is a 
Hearing Denied, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 17, 26 (19-71). 
61. See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 2 Cal. App. 3d 767, 772, 82 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 
(1969); State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wash. 2d 652,414 P.2d 784 (1966). 
62. See State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wash. 2d 652, 657-58, 414 P.2d 784, 788. 
Prosecutors generally have wide discretion in areas that may be of even more vital 
concern to the defendant. Initially, the prosecutor may decide whether or not to 
prosecute. He determines the charge and the sentence to be sought, including 
whether to ask for the death penalty where that option exists. And he may, through-
out much of the proceeding, elect to plea bargain with the defendant. See Schwartz, 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 64 (1948). 
63. People v. Rojas, 2 Cal. App. 3d 767, 771, 82 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864-65 (1969); 
People v. Flores, 276 Cal. App. 2d 61, 81 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1969). The Rojas Court, 
after rejecting the due process argument against indictment, reminded the defendant 
that one who is indicted in California still has post-indictment remedies. If he be-
lieves the grand jury has no grounds upon which to indict him, he can petition the 
superior court to set aside the indictment under CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 
1970). If relief is denied, he can petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of 
appeal under CAL. PENAL CoDE § 999a (West 1970). 2 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 82 
Cal. Rptr. at 865. In stressing the availability of post-indictment remedies, the court 
rejected a claim based on the inability of the defendant to cross-examine witnesses 
before an indictment. 
64. The court in People v. Flores, 276 Cal. App. 2d 61, 81 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1969), 
in denying a due process and equal protection attack against the grand jury; passed 
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2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata 
The first intimation by the Supreme Court of California that the 
prosecutor's discretionary power might be circumscribed came in Jones 
v. Superior Court.65 In Jones, the prosecutor included in the informa-
tion certain charges based on facts that the magistrate had explicitly 
rejected at the preliminary hearing. As a result, the defendant faced 
trial on accusations for which there could be no finding of probable 
cause without contradicting the magistrate's findings of fact. In 
holding for the defendant, the court declared that a magistrate's ex-
plicit findings of fact were binding on the prosecutor in an informa-
tion filed as a result of that preliminary hearing. 66 The court was 
careful to note that its holding was not merely a matter of legal tech-
nicality but was indispensable to protecting the fundamental rights 
provided by the preliminary hearing and to preserving the critical 
screening- function the hearing was intended to perform. If the 
prosecutor were permitted to file an information that completely dis-
regarded the magistrate's findings of fact, then the accused's right 
to protect himself from groundless or unsupported charges would be 
over the defendant's objection that there were no standards to guide the prosecutor 
in his choice between the two methods. The court stated simply that the grand jury 
was an established part of the state criminal justice administration and that the indict-
ment had served its basic function of informing the defendant of the charge he would 
face at trial. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 65, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 200. 
65. 4 Cal. 3d 660,483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971). 
66. In argument before the court, the district attorney cited as authority for his 
action a series of cases holding that "transactionally related" offenses could be 
charged in the information even though the magistrate expressly or implicitly found 
that there was no probable cause to believe the offenses had been committed. See, 
e.g., Parks v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 609, 611, 241 P.2d 521, 522 (1952); People 
v. Chime!, 68 Cal. 2d 609, 614, 241 P.2d 521, 524, revd. on other grounds, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969). Judicial interpretation of section 739 of the California Penal Code, 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 739 (West 1970), had developed two requirements for applica-
tion of the rule: (1) the evidence before the magistrate had to show that the offense 
had been committed, and (2) the offense must have arisen out of the transaction 
which was the basis for the binding-over on a related offense. Jones v. Superior 
Court, 4 Cal. 3d at 664, 483 P.2d at 1243, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 291. 
Although it did not explicitly overrule the transactional principle, the court in 
Jones held that its application in this case would violate the state constitution because 
it would allow prosecution in the absence of a prior determination by a magistrate 
or grand jury that such action was justified. 4 Cal. 3d at 666, 483 P.2d at 1243, 
94 Cal. Rptr. at 292. One commentator has explained that the transactional prin-
ciple was intended to permit the prosecution to dispute a magistrate's erroneous desig-
nation of the offense when it is shown by the evidence to have occurred; that is, it 
was intended to apply to errors of law. See Graham & Letwin, supra note 14, at 
959. Thus, the prosecutor's power to add rejected charges to the information serves 
as a means of seeking review of the magistrate's legal ruling. However, he is not 
permitted to ignore the magistrate's findings of fact and to cliarge the defendant with 
an offense that the magistrate had expressly found never took place. In the language 
of § 739 of the penal code, an offense cannot be one "shown by the evidence taken 
before the magistrate to have been committed" if the magistrate has made a contrary 
finding of fact on any element of the crime, 
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obliterated, and the preliminary hearing would be reduced to a use-
less exercise. 67 
Jones did not significantly reduce the prosecutor's discretionary 
power. Nevertheless, the holding was important because it estab-
lished at least one outer limit on the exercise of that power: once 
the prosecutor decided to use the information procedure, he would 
be bound by the magistrate's explicit findings of- fact, at least insofar 
as he was not willing to begin anew with another information or an 
indictment. Even so, the holding in Jones raised new questions. 
The prosecutor apparently remained free either to seek another 
hearing by refiling charges .against the defendant before a second 
magistrate or to take the case to the grand jury. Jones left open 
the question of whether prior factual determinations are accorded the 
same respect when the prosecutor attempts to relitigate the case by 
either procedure. 68 
The California Supreme Court was soon . confronted with this 
issue in People v. Uhlemann. 69 The defendant in that case was 
charged with the sale of marijuana. At the conclusion of a prelimi-
nary hearing that lasted four days, the magistrate dismissed the com-
plaint by finding that the defense of entrapment had been estab-
lished. 70 The prosecutor then sought and obtained a grand jury in-
dictment on the basis of the same evidence.71 
There was no question in Uhlemann about the validity of the 
general rule that in criminal cases the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, which are required by constitutional double 
jeopardy provisions, apply only to proceedings in which jeopardy 
67. 4 Cal. 3d at 668, 483 P.2d at 1245, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
68. There was also a question about the applicability of the holding to the more 
typical situation in which the magistrate dismisses on the merits without making ex-
plicit factual findings. It remains unclear whether the rule would reach the implied 
factual findings of such a dismissal. 
69. 9 Cal. 3d 662,511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973). 
70. The testimony of the prosecution's chief witness was found to be "inherently 
incredible" and ''unbelievable." The witness, a friend of the accused, herself had 
been arrested for possession of marijuana prior to agreeing · to cooperate with the 
police in an alleged desire to perform a "public service" without any anticipation of 
leniency. See People v. -Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 39-3, 503 P.2d 277, 279, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
21, 23 (1972), vacated, 9 Cal. 3d 662,511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973). 
71. Following indictment, the defendant was tried and convicted in the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County. Shortly after that verdict, however, the supreme court 
reached its decision in Jones, see notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text. On de-
fendant's motion, the superior court granted a new trial and dismissed the action. 
The state appealed that decision and obtained a reversal from the second district 
court of appeal. People v. Uhlemann, 24 Cal. App. 3d 608, 100 Cal. Rptr. 539 
(1972). On the defendant's appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's 
decision granting a new trial, People v. Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 393, 503 P.2d 277, 105 
Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972), but this decision was, in turn, vacated on rehearing. 9 Cal. 
3d 662,511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973). 
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has attached. 72 Moreover, the defendant in Uh/emann did not 
challenge the general principle that a magistrate's dismissal of 
criminal charges following a preliminary examination does not bar 
the prosecutor from either refiling or seeking an indictment. 78 In-
stead, the defendant sought to limit the general rule to those situa-
tions where the magistrate's findings did not reach the merits of the 
case. The defendant claimed that further prosecution should be 
barred by common-law rule where the magistrate's explicit findings 
of fact affirmatively established the defendant's innocence or dis-
closed an absolute defense. 
Three independent rationales were advanced in Uhlemann for 
establishing a common-law rule of collateral estoppel or res judicata 
in cases where the magistrate has determined the merits, but a 
majority of the court rejected each of these arguments. First, the 
defendant contended that the purpose of the holding in Jones re-
quires this additional limit on prosecutorial discretion. 74 Because 
Jones prevents the prosecutor from disregarding the magistrate's 
findings of fact by filing an unsupported information, it might be 
equally desirable to prevent circumvention of those findings through 
the indictment procedure. In at least some cases, indictment would 
be possible only because the defendant lacks the opportunity to pre-
sent exonerating testimony or other evidence. Allowing the prose-
cutor to resort to this alternative route would undermine the useful-
ness of the preliminary examination in screening out groundless 
charges and in protecting the defendant from harassment. However, 
the court in Uhlemann rejected this analysis and concluded that 
nothing in Jones justified foreclosing the prosecutols alternatives of 
refiling or indictment. The only constitutional requirement was that 
the defendant not be subjected to trial unless the prosecutor had first 
obtained a finding of probable cause through one of the two proce-
dures. In the present case that requirement had been fulfilled by 
the obtaining of an indictment. 75 
· Second, it was argued that the prosecutor would not be without 
a remedy even though res judicata and collateral estoppel principles 
applied. Where the prosecutor disagreed with the magistrate's de-
termination, he had the remedy of appeal. 76 The court, however, 
12. See Ex parte Fenton, 77 Cal. 183, 19 P. 267 (1888), 
73. 9 Cal. 3d at 664, 511 P.2d at 610, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 658. See People v. Pre-
witt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 340, 341 P.2d 1, 6, (1959); Ex parte Fenton, 77 Cal, 183, 184 
19 P. 267, 267 (1888). 
74. 9 Cal. 3d at 668-69, 511 P.2d at 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 661. See Graham 
& Letwin, supra note 14, at 960-61. 
75. 9 Cal. 3d at 669, 511 P.2d at 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 661. 
76. Under the general rule that a defendant is not placed in jeopardy at a pre-
liminary hearing, see text at note 72 supra, the right of the state to appeal a dismissal 
by the magistrate would appear to be assured by § 1466(1)(a) of the penal 
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suggested that the prosecutor would be unduly handicapped if he 
were restricted to the sole remedy of appeal. 71 Under this view al-
most all factual findings made by the magistrate would remain unre-
viewable;78 only those cases dismissed because of a magistrate's error 
of law or a clearly erroneous view of the facts would be reviewable. 
Finally, it was argued that the number of cases in which the pro-
posed extension of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel would apply would be so small that no appreciable burden 
would be placed on the judicial system by affording defendants this 
added measure of protection. 79 Defendants very rarely choose to 
offer a defense at the preliminary hearing, 80 and magistrates are not 
ordinarily willing to find unequivocally that the defendant was factu-
ally innocent or had an absolute defense to _ the charge. 81 Since 
Jones affirmed the magistrate's power to weigh the evidence, resolve 
conflicts, and give or withhold credence to individual witnesses, 82 it 
might be argued that the magistrate should have the power of bind-
ing dismissal where the evidence before him points convincingly to 
the conclusion that prosecution is not warranted. The Uhlemann 
court, however, concluded that because a magistrate need not even 
be a member of the bar, 88 he should not be empowered to terminate 
code, which permits an appeal "[f]rom an order or judgment dismissing or otherwise 
terminating the action before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy." CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1466(1)(a) (West 1970). -See People v. Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 393, 
503 P.2d 277, 284, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21, 28, (1972), vacated on rehearing, 9 Cal. 3d 
662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973); People v. Lopez, 265 Cal. App. 2d 
Supp. 980, 982, 71 Cal. Rptr. 667, 668 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1968). 
The Ulzlemann court, however, expressed some reservations about this right of 
appeal, 9 Cal. 3d at 668, 511 P.2d at 6_13, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 661, and there is some 
authority that the state cannot get judicial review of an adverse decision at a pre-
liminary hearing. See People v. Joseph, 153 Cal. App. 2d 548, 551, 314 P.2d 1004, 
1006 (1957); Graham & Letwin, supra note 14, at 731. 
77. 9 Cal. 3d at 668, 511 P.2d at 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 661. 
78. See DeMond v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 340, 345, 368 P.2d 865, 867, 19 
Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1962). 
19. See 9 Cal. 3d at 677, 511 P.2d at 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). 
80. ISee Graham & Letwin, supra note 14, at 700 (suggesting that the widespread 
belief of defense counsel in the folly of offering a defense at a preliminary hearing 
can be attributed in part to a tactical reluctance to reveal the specifics of the defense 
prematurely). 
81. 9 Cal. 3d at 677, 511 P.2d at 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). 
82. 4 Cal. 3d at 667, 483 P.2d at 1245, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
83. The court cited CAL. PENAL CoDB § 808(5) (West 1970), which designates 
judges of the justice courts as magistrates. 9 Cal. 3d at 668, 511 P.2d at 613, 108 
Cal. Rptr. at 661. CAL. Govr. CODE § 71601 (West 1976) permits a nonlawyer to 
qualify for a justice court judgeship merely by passing a qualifying examination. 
Subsequent to the decision in Ulzlemann, however, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that due process guarantees require that justice court judges, who were au-
thorized to try misdemeanors punishable by a fine of up to $1000 or by imprisonment 
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forever the prosecution of one who was accused of a criminal of-
fense. 84 Thus, this view holds that to give res judicata or collateral 
estoppel effect to his opinions would be to convert the magistrate 
into a judge and the preliminary examination into a trial. 
In summary, the court in Uhlemann was unwilling to place 
further procedural limitations upon the prosecutor's discretionary 
power. Yet it appears that the principal motivation for the majority's 
result was not the desire to facilitate prosecutorial discretion but was 
instead the fear that magistrates would exercise too much power if 
their decisions were given collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. 
The dissent responded to this fear when it asserted that magistrates 
would infrequently choose to make an explicit finding of innocence 
or of the existence of an absolute defense. 85 Extending upon the 
dissent's analysis, it can be argued that where the prosecution has 
failed in a preliminary hearing not only to make a showing of prob-
able cause but also to overcome a vigorous defense, there is substan-
tial justification-indeed, if only for reasons of efficiency-for allow-
ing the screening function to be performed at that point. Although 
a weak case would also be screened out when refiled before a 
second magistrate or a grand jury, the second litigation only serves 
to waste judicial resources. Even if these subsequent screening pro-
cedures fail to operate as expected, there would be such a low prob-
ability of conviction that the required expenditure of judicial re-
sources would not be justified. 
However, the facts of the Uhlemann case itself raise doubts about 
the validity of these assumptions. While it is perhaps not surprising 
that a grand jury indicted Uhlemann in the absence of any defense 
testimony, it is also a fact that he was convicted by a jury after a 
full adversary proceeding. If it is the predictive function of the 
screening device that is the chief justification for its existence, then it is 
difficult in the context of the Uhlemann case to support the value of a 
magistrate's power to terminate all further proceedings. 
There is also a more fundamental objection to the dissent's 
position that collateral estoppel or res judicata principles should be 
for one year or less, must be attorneys if they preside over trials of offenses punish• 
able by imprisonment. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 
Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975); see The Supreme Court 
of California 1973-1974, 63 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1, 227 (1975). The court also stated, in 
dictum, that the same standard would probably be required of justice court judges 
serving as magistrates at felony preliminary examinations. 12 Cal. 3d at 326 n.2, 
525 P.2d at 74 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634 n.2. 
In response to Gordon, the legislature passed a statute that provided that all va• 
cant justice court judgeships must be filled by attorneys. CAL. Govr. CODE § 71701 
(West 1976). The Supreme Court of California held that this statute rendered 
justice court judges who are not attorneys ineligible for reelection in Fong Eu v. 
Chacon, 16 Cal. 3d 465, 546 P.2d 289, 128 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976). 
84. 9 Cal. 3d at 668, 511 P.2d at 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 661. 
85. See text at notes 79-81 supra. 
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applied to magistrate's findings. The magistrate's power to dispose 
of cases may well induce the prosecutor to send even more cases 
to the grand jury, since his power to select either procedure would 
still be unfettered. Thus, the imposition of such principles might 
be counterproductive-it might actually increase unfettered prosecu-
torial discretion rather than minimize it. A more satisfactory solu-
tion would eliminate the prosecutor's incentive to opt for indictment 
where there is no public policy justifying that choice. This alterna-
tive to minimizing the disparity between indictment and information 
requires more detailed analysis. 
II. THE Johnson RULE 
In Johnson v. Superior Court,86 defense counsel, cognizant of the 
courts' generally protective attitude toward prosecutorial discretion 
as evidenced by Jones and Uhlemann, advanced a more modest 
claim when appealing his client's conviction for the illegal sale of nar-
cotics. He requested the court to hold that, where the defendant 
successfully rebuts the prosecutor's evidence at a preliminary hearing 
and the prosecutor then chooses to seek an indictment, the prosecu-
tor is required to inform the· gr.and jury of the existence of excul-
patory evidence. 87 -
The Supreme Court of California upheld the defendant's claim 
on the basis of section 939.7 of the state's penal code: 
The grand jury is not required to hear evidence for the defend-
ant, but it shall weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and when 
it has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will ex-
plain away the charge, it shall order the evidence to be produced, and 
for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process 
for the witnesses. 88 
In rejecting the prosecutor's contention that no obligation had at• 
tached in this case because the grand jury had not ordered the 
production of additional evidence, the court was implicitly acknowl-
edging the fundamental disparities between indictment and informa-
tion. Because indictment is not an adversarial proceeding, the jurors 
are not likely to know of the existence of exculpatory information 
unless the prosecutor gives them that knowledge. To allow him to 
conceal the existence of such information and then defend his action 
on the ground that it had not been requested strains rationality. 
Therefore, the court concluded that the statute imposes on the prose-
86. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975). 
87. The defendant also contended that lie had been deprived of due process by 
the very nature of the indictment procedure. Because the case was decided on stat-
utory grounds, the due process argument was not considered by the majority, although 
it was the basis of an·extended concurring opinion by Justice Mosk. 15 Cal. 3d at 
255, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36, 539 P.2d at 796. 
88. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.7 (West 1970). 
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cutor an affirmative obligation to inform the grand jury of any evi-
dence within his knowledge that reasonably tends to negate guilt, 
so that the jurors may exercise their power under the statute to call 
for additional evidence. 89 
The purpose of the Johnson rule is to prevent the prosecutor 
from using the indictment option solely to deprive the defendant of 
any opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. The rule is de-
signed to check the discriminatory use of indictment where no public 
policy justifies that choice. 90 It accomplishes this purpose not by 
restricting the prosecutor's discretionary power but by eliminating the 
incentive to exercise it in certain types of cases. If the prosecutor 
must inform the grand jury that he is seeking an indictment because 
he lost at the preliminary hearing, the assumption implicit in the rule 
is that the jurors will demand a full explanation and may call the 
defendant to testify. Thus the prosecutor will not gain any advan-
tage by resorting to the nonadversarial forum. 
It is significant that the court presumed the existence of a grand 
jury with sufficient independence and self-assertiveness to question 
the prosecutor's judgment and motives. People v. McAlister91 raised 
doubts about the validity of that assumption. In that case, a prelimi-
nary hearing was held, but the magistrate failed to agree with the 
prosecutor on the charges to be filed. The prosecutor then sought 
a grand jury indictment. Defense counsel wrote a letter to the grand 
jury informing it of the existence of alibi witnesses and other ex-
culpatory information; the letter was delivered to the clerk of the 
court. An indictment was subsequently issued on the charges re-
quested by the prosecutor. However, the grand jury transcript made 
no mention of the letter, and there was no evidence indicating 
whether the grand jury had received or considered it. 
On defendant's motion, the trial court set aside four of the five 
counts of the grand jury's indictment on alternative grounds: either 
(1) the district attorney failed to inform the grand jury about the 
existence of evidence tending to negate the charges against the 
defendant, or (2) if the evidence was brought to the attention of 
the grand jury, the jury abused its discretion by failing to subpoena 
the witnesses. 92 
The California Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed this as-
pect of the trial court's action by holding that the rule of Johnson 
does not apply retroactively to grand jury proceedings antedating the 
decision.93 However, the court went on to state that, even if Johnson 
89. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36. 
90. See text at notes 33-38 supra. 
91. 54 Cal. App. 3d 918, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1976). 
92. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 882. 
93. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 926, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The indictment in McAlister 
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were given retroactive effect, it would not benefit this defendant. 
The court concluded that the prosecutor had not violated his duty 
so long as the grand jury received the information by some means. 
Because the defendant did not meet his burden of proving that the 
clerk failed to perform his duty, delivery of the letter would be pre-
sumed, thereby relieving the prosecutor of his obligation under John-
son. 9~ With respect to the grand jury's alleged abuse of discretion, 
the court of appeal stated that nothing in Johnson altered the dis-
cretionary nature of the grand jury's power as prescribed by statute915 
-the jurors were free to consider or to ignore the exculpatory 
evidence that the defendant offered them. 96 
The court of appeal's interpretation in McAlister of the prosecu-
tor's duty seems too lenient in light of the purpose of the Johnson 
rule. 97 The deterrent effect of the rule depends upon the imposition 
on the prosecutor of an affirmative obligation of disclosure. That 
duty should not be discharged upon the mere assumption that the 
grand jurors received information from another source. In the 
setting of the grand jury hearing as it is presently structured, it is 
unlikely that any other source possesses as much influence as the 
prosecutor. If the defendant and his counsel are not permitted to 
participate directly in the hearing as a matter of right, it should re-
main the prosecutor's affirmative duty to disclose the existence of 
exculpatory information. This rule best assures that the defendant's 
interests are protected and that all known evidence tending to negate 
guilt is presented to the grand jury. 
It should be emphasized that the McAlister court reaffirmed the 
grand jury's discretionary power to consider or receive evidence. 98 
was issued on August 27, 1974, and the Johnson decision became final on September 
19, 1975. 
94. 54 <;:al. App. 3d at 926, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The only known fact was , 
that the letter, which was addressed to the grand jury and the judge, had been de-
livered to the clerk of the court. The clerk had an official duty to deliver the 
letter. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court said, it would apply the 
statutory presumption that the official duty had been properly carried out. See 
CAL. EVID. CODE§ 664 (West 1970). 
95. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.7 (West 1970). 
96. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 927, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The court of appeal com-
mented that "the effect of (the trial court's holding) would be to fetter the grand 
jury with an incapacity to return an indictment until it has summoned all potential 
witnesses designated by an accused or his counsel, whether they number five as in 
this case, or five hundred." 54 Cal. App. 3d at 926-27, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 886. 
97. However, the McAlister opinion may not be indicative of future interpreta-
tions of Johnson. Since the decision on retroactivity was in itself dispositive, the sub-
sequent statements by the court may be considered to be dictum. 
98. See text at notes 95-96 supra. 
The case on which the court of appeal relied in interpreting § 939.7 was 
decided before Johnson. People v. Conway, 42 Cal. App. 3d 875, 890, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
251, 261 (1974). In light of the fact that the statute is ambiguous at best and was 
interpreted in a different context in the earlier case, that decision should not be re-
garded as controlling. 
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Imposing an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to present exculpa-
tory evidence is not at odds with the grand jury's proper powers. In-
deed, a literal reading of the statutory language supports this conclu-
sion, which was also reached by the trial court: "The grand jury is 
not required to hear evidence for the defendant, but . . . when it 
has reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain 
away the charge, it shall order the evidence to be produced."00 
After McAlister, it appears that the grand jury must at least be 
informed of the existence of exculpatory evidence; however, the 
grand jury in its discretion need not hear all evidence or subpoena 
every witness brought to its attention. This point is crucial because 
the protection afforded to the defendant is lessened considerably if 
the grand jury is still free to decide which evidence it will hear. It 
may be asked how the grand jurors can determine whether or not 
evidence within their rea.ch or even evidence presented to them 
might explain away the charge if they can reject the evidence 
entirely without examining it.100 
However, even if the restrictive McAlister decision is indicative 
of future interpretations of Johnson, the California rule should still 
accomplish three important purposes. First, it should lessen the 
troubling disparity between indictment and information in the degree 
of protection available to defendants. The indicted defendant will 
still be disadvantaged relative to his counterpart prosecuted by infor-
mation since the latter enjoys the benefits of an adversarial forum, but 
the gap will have been narrowed. Second, the usefulness of the grand 
jury as a screening device should be improved when the prosecutor is 
forced to disclose the weak aspects of his case. Finally, the incen-
tive for the prosecutor to exercise his indictment option solely for 
the purpose of circumventing a defense of the accused, if not totally 
eliminated, should at least be diminished considerably.101 
99. CAL. PENAL CooE § 937.6 (West 1970) (emphasis added). The amount of 
discretion given the grand jury varies among the states. See LA. CoDE CRIM. PRo. 
ANN. art. 442 (West 1967) ("When the grand jury has reason to believe that other 
available evidence will explain the charge, it should order the evidence produced."); 
NEV. REV. SrAT. § 172.145 (1967) ("[W]hen [the grand jurors] have reason to believe 
that other evidence within their reach will explain away the charge, they must order 
such evidence to be produced .••. "); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 190.50 (Mc-
Kinney 1971) ("[l]t may direct the district attorney to issue and serve a subpoena 
upon such witness [believed by it to possess relevant information] .... ") (emphasis 
added to each quotation). 
100. See Gough & Emery, The Nature of the California Grand Jury: An Evalua-
tion, 2 SANTA CLARA LAW. 72, 73-74 (1962). 
101. It should be noted that this pUfPOSe is fulfilled in several contexts. For ex-
ample, if the defendant presents an exonerating defense at the preliminary hearing, 
the Johnson rule discourages the prosecutor from seeking an indictment in a subse-
quent proceeding. Further, the Johnson rule deters the prosecutor from seeking an 
indictment in a situation where his primary desire is to initiate a prosecution even 
though there is no substantial probability of ultimately convicting the defendant at 
trial. . 
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Nevertheless, there are likely to be some significant problems in 
the practical application of the Johnson rule. Most of the difficulties 
will arise from the fact that the rule further complicates the prosecu-
tor's inherently contradictory role in presenting the people's case 
before the grand jury. On the one hand, the prosecutor is an offi-
cer of the state, required to make every effort to prosecute and con-
vict those accused of violating the law. On the other, he is an 
officer of the court, charged with acting as the grand jury's legal 
counsel, who must assist but not direct its finding of probable 
cause.102 While it may be true as a matter of principle that any 
attempt by the prosecutor to influence the grand jury's action or to 
color the evidence put forward is improper,1°3 it would be unrealistic 
to expect that he will neither select nor present the evidence in a 
manner designed to influence the jurors to agree with his view of 
the case.104 Of course, remedies exist for undue influence by the 
prosecutor, and the grand jury may always refuse to indict.105 Yet 
the problem of conflict of interest is continuously present, even in 
those cases where the prosecutor tries to carry out his dual role con-
scientiously. 
By charging the prosecutor with the duty of evaluating and 
presenting evidence favorable to the defendant, the Johnson rule 
further complicates this situation. If the rule had been created to 
deal only with the problem of prosecutorial forum shopping, this con-
flict would not be so sharp. In this event the prosecutor would have 
to do no more than inform the jurors that there had been a prior hear-
ing before the magistrate. However, because the rule was based on 
the language of an existing statute, it was phrased in broader terms 
than were required by the specific facts of Johnson. The prosecutor 
must now inform the grand jury of any information within his knowl-
edge that reasonably tends to negate guilt. Initially, he must decide 
whether a piece of information that he has obtained is exculpatory. 
If so, he must then explain the nature and significance of such evi-
dence to the grand jurors, so that they may decide whether or not 
to call for it. 
Ideally, all of these determinations are encompassed within the 
prosecutor's "neutral" role as legal adviser. Realistically, in close 
cases the benefit of the doubt must be given to either the defendant's 
or the prosecutor's version of the facts. In the grand jury setting 
as it is currently structured, only the prosecutor is empowered to de-
tail the facts of the case; hence, it is inevitable that this presentation 
102. See Comment, supra note 55, at 76S. 
103. See G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 129 (1906). 
104. See Comment, supra note 55, at 765-66. 
105. Id. at 766. 
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will not be equivalent to that which would be made by the defend-
ant's counsel. 
The problem of requiring a high degree of impartiality from the 
prosecutor in the grand jury setting is analogous to the difficulty pre-
sented by the Giles-Brady rule, which prohibits the prosecutor from 
withholding material exculpatory evidence at trial.100 Effective re-
view of the prosecutor's determination about what constitutes excul-
patory evidence is available only if the defendant has access to the 
evidence from another source. In Johnson, of course, the defendant 
already had the evidence that he wanted to present to the grand jury, 
but the Johnson rule also applies to those situations where the prose-
cutor alone has such potentially exculpatory information. 
Yet it is not even necessary to presume bad faith on the prosecu-
tor's part to postulate frustration of the Johnson rule. His chief 
responsibility is to prepare the state's case, not that of the defendant. 
He may unconsciously minimize or overlook the significance to the 
defendant of a piece of information.107 Of course, if the grand jury 
has the option of not calling for such evidence, the temptation of 
the prosecutor intentionally to minimize its importance or to color 
its presentation will be increased. 
Apart from these procedural difficulties, the Johnson rule is open 
to the objection that its scope is far too narrow. Because the major-
ity opinion was reached on statutory grounds, the court did not con-
sider the defendant's constitutional arguments. This deliberate 
avoidance was sharply criticized in Justice Mosk's concurring opinion. 
He and Chief Justice Wright were prepared to agree with the de-
fendant that prosecution by indictment under the existing system 
denies the accused fundamental rights at a critical stage of the crimi-
nal process and results in violations of equal protection and due pro-
cess under the state constitution. Their proposed remedy was to re-
quire a post-indictment preliminary hearing.108 
Other critics of the prosecutorial system do not share Justic~ 
Mosk's belief that sufficient additional safeguards can be added to 
the indictment procedure to eliminate the existing inequities. Cur-
rent proposals for reform that go beyond the scope of the Johnson 
rule range from expanded pretrial criminal discovery to complete 
abolition of the grand jury's indictment function.100 
106. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 
101. See Nakell, supra note 27, at 458. 
108. 15 Cal. 3d at 256, 539 P.2d at 797, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (concurring opin• 
ion). 
109. There are six current proposals for reform that go beyond the scope of 
Johnson. First, there is a proposal to place substantial limitations on the prosecutor's 
power to refile or seek an indictment after the initial preliminary examination. This 
was the remedy employed by the California Supreme Court in the original Uhlemann 
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All of these more comprehensive reforms that have been pro-
posed share a common disadvantage: in only a very small number 
of states is it probable that any one of them will be implemented 
either by legislative enactment or by judicial order in the foreseeable 
future. The chief obstacles to change appear to be the Supreme 
Court's past support for the constitutional "equivalence" of indict-
meri.t110 and a general unwillingness on the part of the judiciary to 
curtail the power of prosecutors and the authority of grand juries. 
As a consequence of this impasse, the Johnson rule takes on 
greater significance, even though its potential benefit to the defen-
dant is modest when compared to that promised by more fundamental 
reforms. At least fifteen states have statutes or court rules that are 
similar to the statute on which the Supreme Court of California based 
its ruling in J ohnson.111 A. dozen of these are information states 
opinion. •If the prosecutor's motivation is based solely on the hope that a second 
magistrate or a grand jury will look more favorably on the same evidence, relitigation 
may reward casual preparation, permit harassment, and waste judicial resources. See 
Graham & Letwin, supra note 14, at 730-31. One consequence of such a change 
would be the need to improve the quality of magistrates to a level commensurate with 
those new powers. See note 83 supra. 
Second, it has been suggested that an indicted defendant be invited to testify be-
fore the grand jury. See Scragg, The Grand Jury, 2 TEMP. LQ. 317, 325 (1928). 
The Grand Jury Committee of the San Diego Bar Association has recommended that 
a prosecutor who has knowledge of exculpatory information be required to invite the 
accused to testify. Grand Jury Report, supra note 30, at 175. A refusal of the in-
vitation would neither be disclosed to nor discussed by the jurors. Such a change 
would face the usual resistance to infringements upon the historical prerogatives of 
the grand jury, see text at notes 55-58 supra. 
Third, some have proposed a mandatory post-indictment preliminary hearing. 
Justice Mosk's proposal in Johnson is currently in effect in Michigan and Oklahoma 
and has some support among legal writers. See Alexander & Portman, supra note 
2, at 1013-14. However, this recommendation has met with opposition in some states. 
See Comment, Post-Indictment Preliminary Hearings?, 9 J. MAR. J. OF PRAc. & PROC. 
499 (1976). 
Fourth, the American Law Institute has taken the position that, while a felony 
defendant may waive his right to a preliminary hearing, that right cannot be ter-
minated by an indictment. MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1 
& Commentary (1975). The ALI model code also requires that the defendant be 
permitted to appear before the grand jury, accompanied by a nonparticipating attor-
ney. Id. at § 340.3 & Commentary. 
Fifth, expanded pretrial criminal discovery has been suggested. One innova-
tive approach here has been to recommend the institutionalization of the informal 
discovery opportunities that have been available to defendants at the preliminary 
hearing. See Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal Defense Discovery, 62 
KY. L.J. 58 (1973). Such a proposal is designed to minimize the procedural dis-
advantages of the indictment. 
Finally, it bas been recommended that the grand jury's subpoena power be trans-
ferred to the prosecutor and all prosecutions be by information. See Campbell, supra 
note 19, at 180-81. This is obviously the simplest proposal for procedural equaliza-
tion but also the least likely to be enacted, given the entrenched position of the grand 
jury in those states that have retained it. · 
110. 'See text at notes 40-43 supra. 
111. ALASKA R. Cr. P. & AD. CRIM. P. 6(q); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 21-412 (1971); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-918 (1964); IDAHO CoDB § 19-1106 (1947); IOWA CoDE ANN. 
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where the specific prosecutorial abuse exemplified by Johnson may 
occur. Implementation of the Johnson rule by court decision is a 
relatively easy first step in limiting the prosecutor's ability to take 
unfair advantage of his discretionary po~er. 
Such a limitation upon prosecutorial discretion is desirable as a 
matter of policy even if it is not constitutionally required. The in-
equities inherent in the present dual system of prosecution are acci-
dental by-products of historical development. As noted earlier, in 
some cases the adverse effects of the present procedure upon the 
individual may be outweighed by attendant benefits to the criminal 
justice system as a whole.112 However, the discretionary power ac-
corded the prosecutor cannot be justified as a tactical weapon to be 
used merely to circumvent the preliminary hearing and the benefits 
that proceeding bestows on the defendant. Unlimited prosecutorial 
manipulation of that power should no longer be tolerated. 
§ 771.15 (West 1950); LA. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 442 (West 1967); MoNT. 
REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1408(b) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.145 (1967); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-5-ll(B) (1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.50 (McKinney 
1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-27 (1974); On.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 335 
(West 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 132.320(4) (1975); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 
23-30-12 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-19-4 (1953). 
112. See text at notes 33-37 supra. 
